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ARGUMENT ONE
PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
CLEARLY SOUNDED IN CONTRACT
The Appellee on page 10 of their Red Brief claims that the Lower Court looked at the
underlying alleged conduct to determine the applicability of governmental immunity.
The Appellee then quoted the minute entry from the Honorable Robert Hilder, District
Court Judge, as follows:
"[although Plaintiff pleads those causes of action as sounding in
contract, which would otherwise not be subject to governmental
immunity... the court is required to look to the underlying alleged
conduct or situation out of which plaintiffs claim arises when
determining the applicability of governmental immunity. Bullock
v. State Dept. of Transportation, 966 P.2d 1215, 1217 (Utah App.
1998). Here, the essence of the allegedly wrongful conduct by the
County is its failure or refusal to issue a requested governmental
permit, which conduct is undisputedly subject to immunity.
Plaintiffs now assert, in oral argument on their motion, that the
remedy they seek is merely the Count's reconsideration of their
permit application in accordance with specified laws as
contractually required by a Stipulation and Order entered
November 29, 1999 in settlement of a prior lawsuit (i.e., Butler
Crockett and Walsh Development Corp. v. Salt Lake County, Utah
Third District Court No. 970902479). However, Plaintiffs' prayer
for relief in the instant case does not seek such a remedy, but rather
seeks a "declaratory judgment" granting Plaintiffs their requested
permit, together with $ 100,000.00 damages. Thus Plaintiffs'
Complaint requests that the Court reverse the County's denial of
the permit and award money damages, which it cannot do because
of governmental immunity."
Appellant submits that while the legal principles submitted by the Lower Court are
correct, they do not apply in the instant case for the following reasons:
First, the FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION, clearly states a cause of action for breach of
contract.
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F I R S T C A U S E ul»'A< TI'« ,i P I
"8 I 'la;!,! itiff incoi pc rates in i this tl i = • I :"ii st Cai lse of Action,
paragraphs 1 through and including 7 and by this
reference each is made a part hereof.
9. Ih,i' ii, • i il- i I * Moltei ' 1 I"111" P h ' i t f i l P ' l o f .in
Application for Tourist H o m e for the residence located at
9500 Emigration Canyon Road, Salt Lake County, I Jtah
10 1 1 lat on or aboi it November iV, J ^vw, I laiuli 11 herein iiiitl
Defendant resolved a lawsuit, between the parties pursuant
to a written Stipulation.
11. That pursuant to said settlement agreement
entitled Butler, Crockett and Walsh Development
Corporation, a Utah Corporation, Plaintiff vs. Salt Lake
County, a body corporate and politic of the State of Utah,
Defendant Cm I N" oyoonxpo in ,iml I'm S.ill I ±t
County, State of Utah, Defendant Salt Lake County
agreed as follows:
"2. Salt Lake County and all of its applicable Boards,
Commissions and Staff shall proceed to consider and
decide the Application on the merits under the law and
ordinances that were in place at the time that the
Application was filed, i.e. October 24, 1995.
3. It is the Agreement and intent of the par ties that the
Application for a Tourist Home shall be processed and
considered on the same law and criteria that were in effect
2

at the time the application was filed, i.e. October 24, 1995,
and not on the basis of any subsequent changes in the
same, since the date of Application. It is also the
agreement and intent of the parties that the width of Burr's
Lane, a County Road, will not be considered as a factor in
deciding the Application."
12. That Salt Lake County breached the said contract and
agreement between the parties in that they failed to
consider the said application under the law and criteria in
effect in 1995, as agreed.
13. That as a direct and proximate result of the said breach of
contract the Plaintiff has been severely damaged and the
same is ongoing.
14. Plaintiff is entitled to a Declaratory Judgment establishing
the said Conditional Use for the said property, as well as
to damages in the sum of $100,000.00, plus such other and
additional sums as established at the time of trial on the
merits."
Second, the SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION, clearly sounds in contract as well:
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
15. Plaintiff incorporates in this Second Cause of Action,
paragraphs 1 through and including 14, and by this
reference each is made a part hereof.
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16.That .11 (lie said n^U'riiiiiil Pl.imlill bavin WAS \n
piiivii\ HIH ( - M.iK I .tL: ( \>unl\, (lie quid p r o quo in
exchange for the bargained for position regarding the
Conditional I Jse Permit.
17 Salt I .ake Coi it it) ha s reaped the benefi

*ie said

bargain and has failed to comph with 11- dunes and
responsibilities stemming from the said contract.
Ill I liiil Illi'""1 ni il 11 it uil ihr I H'cgoiui" (IK; IHTeiidiinl lias IKVIII
unjustly enriched to the injury and detriment of the
Plaintiff and therefore the Plaintiff is entitled to the sum of
$100,000.00 plus Mint li ollihi jiniill iiilililiMM.il MIIIIS .is
established at the time of trial on the merits.
Lastly, the THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION, also sounded in contract:
I N I N I H HI SI' H I M I II «l UN
19. Plaintiff incorporates in this the Third Cause of Action,
paragraphs 1 through and including 18, and b> this
reference each is i i lade a p a i 11 it. s i e c f.
20. That inherent is the subject contract and agreement
• between the parties is a covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.
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21. That the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing has caused the Plaintiff severe and continuous
damages.
22. Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment in the sum of
$100,000.00 plus such other and additional sums as
established at the time of trial on the merits."
Therefore for the Lower Court to suggest that".. .the court is required to look to the
underlying alleged conduct or situation out of which plaintiffs claim arises when determining
the applicability of government immunity." and citing Bullock vs. State Dept. of Transportation,
966 P.2d 1215, 1217 (Utah App. 1998), states a correct principle of law, however the same does
not apply in the pending action before this Court.
The First, Second and Third Causes of Action clearly state a breach of contract theory
and therefore it was reversible error for the Trial Court to summarily dismiss the same with
prejudice.
Hypothetically if the County expressly agreed to issue a specific permit and then failed to
do so could the Plaintiff bring a cause of action for breach of contract only to have it thrown out
by the Lower Court because the same involved a "permit".
Here Appellant submits the issue is identical as the parties agreed to resolve a specific
controversy by way of an agreed upon procedure.
The County then breached that agreement giving rise to the First, Second and Third
Causes of Action.
As noted on page 50 of the Appellants Brief it is not the province of the District Court to
rewrite the parties contract:

5

"It is not for the Court to rewrite a contract improvidently entered into at
arm's length or to change the bargain indirectly on the basis of supposed
equitable principles." Dalton vs. Jerico Construction, Co., 642 P.2d 748,
750 (Utah 1982); accord Hal Taylor Associates vs. Unionamerica Inc.,
657 PI 2d, 749 (Utah 1982) also note Roland Webb vs. R.O.A. General
804 P.2d 547, (Utah App. 1991)."
Appellant respectfully submits that the Trial Court as a matter of law essentially ruled
that the parties did not even have a contract and that the sole issue before the Trial Court was the
issuance of a Conditional Use Permit.
This the Lower Court did this before any discovery, any trial or even before the
Defendants so much as filed a responsive Answer.
Salt Lake County argues on appeal that the complaint for declaratory relief merely states
a claim for the failure to issue a permit for which immunity is expressly retained under the
Governmental Immunity Act.
Appellant respectfully submits that the Complaint for Declaratory relief clearly sets forth
Appellant's claims for a breach of contract.
Salt Lake County seems to argue that since Plaintiff requested monetary damages that
somehow this changes the claim from breach of contract to a claim solely made for the failure to
issue a permit.
However this position by Salt Lake County is contrary to Chapter 33, Section 78 of the
Utah Code Annotated regarding Declaratory Judgments, as noted on page 44 of the Appellant's
blue Brief:
78-33-1 Jurisdiction of district courts - Form - Effect
The district courts within their respective jurisdictions
shall have power to declare rights, status and other
legal relations, whether or not further relief is or
could be claimed. No action or proceeding shall be
open to objection on the ground that a declaratory
6

judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration may
be either affirmative or negative in form and effect;
and such declaration shall have the force and effect of a
final judgment or decree.
Appellant submits that there is no prohibition in the law precluding the Appellant
from asserting a cause of action for a breach of contract while at the same time
requesting damages for the said breach.
Frankly, Appellant submits that a clearly more unique scenario would be one
claiming a breach of contract with no damages.
However, including a claim for monetary damages in no way changes the nature
of the claim from a breach of contract to a claim for failure to issue a permit.
On pages 10 and 11 of the Appellee's Red Brief, Salt Lake County seems
to argue that the District Court can not grant the said Conditional Use Permit or Order
that the County is required to, when they stated the following:
"Consequently, the trial court correctly held that BC&W's
claims seeking monetary and declaratory relief were not truly
"contractual," because BC&W was not seeking
"reconsideration" of its permit application allegedly promised
by the County in the settlement agreement. Instead, BC&W
sought a court order actually granting the permit, together
with money damages. In other words, BC&W's lawsuit did
not seek enforcement of the contract with the Court rather, it
sought remedies for denial of the permit."

At the same time on page 19 Salt Lake County argues that the sole remedy for the
Appellant was for the Lower Court to determine "whether or not the decision is arbitrary,
capricious, or illegal." 78-27-1001(3) (ii) UCA.
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What the County does not explain is what the District Court does if it in fact finds
that the County's Decision was arbitrary, capricious or illegal.
In that case does the Trial Court issue a Conditional Use Permit or does the Trial
Court issue an Order to the County requiring the County to issue the Conditional Use
Permit.
Appellant submits that it makes no difference as the Court essentially issued it
either directly or indirectly.
Therefore the request by the Plaintiff in the prayer for relief for the Trial Court to
issue the Conditional Use Permit is what the Court would routinely do either directly or
indirectly had the Trial Court found that the decision of Salt Lake County was arbitrary,
capricious or illegal.
Salt Lake County seems to argue that because Plaintiff asked for monetary
damages that the Court therefore could not determine if the correct criteria had been
applied.
However Salt Lake County stated no reason why that was the case.
Appellant submits that even under the provisions of 78-27-1001 the Court does
not consider a trial de novo but reviews the transcript from the lower tribunal, takes
evidence if the Court finds that helpful and then rules on the same.
This is exactly the procedure submitted by the Appellant in that the Trial Court
would consider what occurred by the lower tribunal, conclude that the wrong criteria had
been applied then take what evidence the Court felt was needful and then rule on the
same.
8

Hence the argument by Salt Lake County that the District Court cannot take the
approach submitted by the Appellant is inherently inconsistent with the County's
position on way appeals are required to be taken.
Bottomline Salt Lake County has not stated any reason why the Trial Court cannot
consider the matter by virtue of the declaratory relief and once the Court concluded that
Salt Lake County had breached the contract, then determine damages from the same.
Additionally Appellant submits that the heart of Salt Lake County's defense is that
everyone agrees that the Plaintiff did not make a claim that had sounded in contract.
Salt Lake County does not take the view that Plaintiff cannot bring a breach of
contract action rather they argue Plaintiff did not bring a breach of contract action. The
Trial Court subjectively determined that the Plaintiff did not bring a contract action but
rather brought a failure to issue permit action.
Appellant submits that this was error by the Trial Court as a Motion to Dismiss at
this stage in the proceedings is to be treated like a Motion for Summary Judgment under
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure where the moving party would have to
establish that there is no genuine material issue of fact and that Salt Lake County would
be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. R.J. Daum Constr. Co. v. Child, 122 Utah 194,
247 P.2d 817 (1952).
Hence, according to the argument advanced by Salt Lake County if this Court
were to agree that Plaintiffs Complaint for Declaratory Relief in fact sounded in contract
then Salt Lake County would have to agree that the Trial Court erred as they have
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advanced no argument to suggest that had Plaintiff asserted a breach of contract claim
then the Trial Court should have considered the same and not dismissed it.
Appellant submits that all parties agree that the Trial Court could have considered
a breach of contract claim.
As a side note it is critical to understand that the plaintiff would be without a
remedy if the Trial Court was precluded from determining damages, as punitive damages
are prohibited as a matter of law
63-30-22

Exemplary or punitive damages prohibited Governmental entity exempt from execution,
attachment, or garnishment

(l)(a) No judgment may be rendered against the governmental
entity for exemplary or punitive damages.
Hence under the theory advanced by Salt Lake County, that the Trial Court could not
consider damages while at the same time declaring that the contract had been breached would in
essence allow Salt Lake County toflagrantlyand deceptively breach their agreements with no
consequences and would never be required to make people whole.
By virtue of the foregoing Appellant respectfully submits that this Court would be
required to determine that there was no genuine material issue of fact and that Salt Lake County
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, in order to hold for the Appellee.
However Appellant submits that the First, Second and Third Causes of Action clearly
sound in contract and therefore it was err for the Trial Court to rule as a matter of law that the
Plaintiff was simply suing for failure to issue a permit as though there had been no prior
commitment by Salt Lake County.

10

Additionally Salt Lake County seems to claim on appeal that the Appellant had to
file a bond as well as a Notice of Claim as noted on page 12 of the Appellee's Red Brief
which states:
"Therefore, the trial court correctly dismissed BC&W's first,
second and third causes of action based upon immunity retained by,
and failure to comply with the procedural requirements of, the
Immunity Act."
However, Salt Lake County does not explain why nor provide this Court with any
authority regarding the same.
As pointed out on page 42 of the Appellant's blue Brief the State Legislature
expressly provided that one need not file a Bond nor a Notice of Claim.
63-30-5

Waiver of immunity as to contractual
obligations.

Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is
waived as to any contractual obligation. Actions
arising out of contractual rights or obligations shall not
be subject to the requirements of Sections 63-30ll(Notice of Claim), 63-30-12, 63-30-13, 63-30-14,
63-30-15, or 63-30-19(Undertaking). (Emphasis
added)
Appellant submits that there can be no question that the Lower Court erred if the
basis for dismissal was based on the Undertaking requirement and/or the Notice of Claim
requirement of the Governmental Immunity Act.
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ARGUMENT TWO
APPELLEE'S CLAIM THAT PLAINTIFF COULD HAVE AMENDED THEIR
COMPLAINT TO ASSERT A LAND USE APPEAL IS WITHOUT MERIT
On pages 12, 13, 14 and 15 Appellee argues in their Red Brief that the Plaintiff had a
remedy in that they could have amended its complaint to assert a land use appeal and that since
Plaintiff did not they abandoned their claim and then failed to prosecute, etc.
Appellant submits that this position by Salt Lake County is without merit for the
following reasons.
First, the facts do not support such a claim.
It is critical for this Court to know that the wrong criteria had been applied and that based
on the wrong criteria Plaintiff could not make out a claim that the land use decision was
arbitrary, capricious or illegal.
Therefore to amend the Complaint to assert a land use appeal would be meaningless.
Salt Lake County seems to overlook that first the Plaintiff must have a cause of action
and second the plaintiff would have to have factual evidence to support the same.
Here with the wrong criteria being applied Plaintiff had neither.
Factually Plaintiff could neither claim nor prove that Salt County's denial of a
Conditional Use Permit was arbitrary when the wrong criteria was applied.
Factually Plaintiff could neither claim nor prove that Salt County's denial of a
Conditional Use Permit was capricious when the wrong criteria was applied.
Factually Plaintiff could not neither claim nor prove that Salt County's denial of a
Conditional Use Permit was illegal when the wrong criteria was applied.
Hence Appellant submits that Salt Lake County's claim that Plaitniff should of amended
its complaint to assert the land use appeal is absurd.
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The heart of Plaintiff s claim is the breach of contract by Salt Lake County in failing to
consider the agreed upon criteria.
Both the law and the facts are consistent with the same, and Salt Lake County's position
that Plaintiff should have a amended its breach of contract claim to land use appeal this
tantamount to suggesting that plaintiff assert a wholly meaningless cause of action for which
there was no factual or evidentiary support.
Additionally, once the Trial Court had gutted the heart of Plaintiff s claims by removing
the breach of contract causes of action, the Plaintiff at that point had not timely appealed the land
use decision, hence the Trial Court had wholly destroyed the Plaintiffs claims all together and
the Plaintiff then could neither assert a land use appeal because the facts did not support the
same nor could it assert a land use appeal because the statute of limitations had at that point
killed the same.
On page 14 of the Appellee's Red Brief Salt Lake County further argues that the Plaintiff
did not frame its actions as one "for taking relief.
Plaintiff factually could not argue that the failure to issue a permit for Conditional Use
Permit constituted a taking of Plaintiff s land.
As noted above there is no factual basis to establish there was a taking of the Plaintiffs
land however the actual taking that occurred was Salt Lake County's actions in taking the quid
pro quo in the underlying lawsuit that was settled with the agreed upon criteria.
Appellant submits that they surely could not bring an action under 78-27-1001 for Salt
Lake County's taking in the lawsuit that was settled calling for the agreed upon criteria as 78-271001 is clearly a land use appeal statute.
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When the Honorable Robert Hilder dismissed the breach of contract claim asserted by
the Plaintiff that resulted in Salt Lake County being allowed to take the Plaintiffs contract rights
without fair compensation. Therefore it is true that Plaintiff did not make a claim for taking
because:
a) the facts do not support such a claim and
b) b) 78-27-1001 did not apply to it anyway.

ARGUMENT THREE
SALT LAKE COUNTY CLAIM REGARDING A FAILURE TO PROSECUTE IS
STRICTLY A DISTRACTION
On page 15 of the Appellee's Red Brief they claim
"On April 21, 2004, BC&W was allowed by the trial court to file
an amended complaint as to its fourth, fifth and sixth causes of
action. BC&W did not do so.
Salt Lake County then proceeds to suggest that Appellant abandon his remaining claims
which the Lower Court dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute.
Plaintiff submits that once the Lower Court had dismissed its breach of contract claim
and thereby dismissing with prejudice the First Cause of Action, the Second Cause of Action and
the Third Cause of Action the remaining causes of action were also dismissed indirectly.
The Fourth Cause of Action actually asserted that the decision to deny the conditional use
application was arbitrary capricious and illegal.
However Plaintiff could not pursue this cause of action because of the Statute of
Limitations problem addressed above as well as in the Blue Brief.
The Fifth Cause of Action asserted a claim on the basis that the Plaintiffs rights had been
violated by virtue of the breach of contract.
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When the Court had dismissed a breach of contract Plaintiff was thereby precluded from
pursuing its Fifth Cause of Action because it had no contract rights thereafter.
The Sixth Cause of Action asserted a claim under 42 USC 1983 for a violation of
Plaintiffs rights.
When the Court had dismissed a breach of contract claims the Plaintiff was thereby
precluded from pursuing its Sixth Cause of Action because it had no contract rights thereafter.
As a result as a practical matter the District Court had dismissed the complaint with
prejudice and on the merits on all six causes of action when the Court dismissed the breach of
contract claims.
Therefore for Salt Lake County to argue that the whole of Plaintiffs complaint was
properly dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute is without merit as the Lower Court
had already dismissed all causes of action as practical matter.
Appellant submits that this failure to prosecute is merely a distraction because Appellant
never appealed that issue.
Salt Lake County in their Red Brief tries to make the same an issue before this Court
when the same is not an issue raised by the Appellant.
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure do not allow for Appellee's to raise issues when
the same are not raise by the Appellant and therefore are not the subject of the appeal.
Salt Lake County is limited to answering the issues raised by the Appellant and cannot
under the Rules raise issues that have nothing to do with the Plaintiffs appeal.
Here on pages 15 through 19 where Salt Lake County argues the Trial Courts discretion
in dismissing Plaintiffs Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action for failure to prosecute has
nothing to do with Plaintiffs claims on appeal for breach of contract.
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Therefore Salt Lake County is merely briefing an issue that is not even raised by the
Appellant.
ARGUMENT FOUR
SALT LAKE COUNTY WHOLLY FAILED TO RESPOND TO VARIOUS
ARGUMENTS RAISED IN THE BLUE BRIEF
Salt Lake County filed no argument nor authority for Appellants Argument One which
was "It is reversible error for the Lower Court to Dismiss the Plaintiffs claims with prejudice for
allegedly failing to file a Notice of Claim.
Appellant showed this Court the provisions of 63-30-5 of the Utah Code Annotated
establishing the fact that as a matter of law no Notice of Claim is required when bringing an
action against a governmental entity for breach of contract.
Salt Lake County filed no response either by way of argument nor by legal authority.
Appellant submits that Salt Lake County apparently agrees that the Lower Courts
dismissal on the basis of failure to file a Notice of Claim was error.
Now having failed to respond in their Reply Brief Appellee should be precluded from
addressing the same for the first time in oral argument
Salt Lake County filed no argument nor authority for Appellants Argument Two which
was "It is reversible error for the Lower Court to dismiss the Plaintiffs claims with prejudice for
allegedly failing to file an undertaking"
Appellant showed this Court the provisions of 63-30-5 of the Utah Code Annotated
where as a matter of law the Plaintiff need not file an undertaking when bringing an action
against a governmental entity.
Salt Lake County filed no response either by way of argument or by way of legal
authority.
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Appellant submits that Salt Lake County apparently agrees that the Lower Courts
dismissal on the basis of failure to file an undertaking was error.
Now having failed to respond in their Reply Brief Appellee should be precluded from
addressing the same for the first time in oral argument.
Salt Lake County filed no argument nor authority for Appellants Argument Six which
was "Since the District Court does not do a Trial De novo the appellant is afforded no remedy."
Appellant showed this Court that since the District Court does not allow Trial De Novo,
under Salt Lake County's theory, Appellant was afforded no remedy.
Salt Lake County filed no response either by way of argument or by way of legal
authority.
Appellant submits that Salt Lake County apparently agrees that the Lower Courts
dismissal on this basis was error.
Now having failed to respond in their Reply Brief Appellee should be precluded from
addressing the same for the first time in oral argument.
Salt Lake County filed no argument nor authority for Appellants Argument Seven which
was " Appellant submits that an action for Declaratory Relief is consistent with Utah State
Law."
Appellant went to great lengths and cited multiple cases establishing the Declaratory
Relief is particularly appropriate when there is a question on the legal standards and appropriate
criteria.
Salt Lake County does not even hint in their Red Brief any type of response to the same
Appellant submits that Salt Lake County apparently agrees that the Lower Courts
dismissal on this basis was error.
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Now having failed to respond in their Reply Brief Appellee should be precluded from
addressing the same for the first time in oral argument
Salt Lake County filed no argument nor authority for Appellants Argument Eight which
was "Appellant submits that the Lower Court essentially rewrote the parties contract."
Appellant submits that there can be no question that the Trial Court rewrote the parties
agreement.
The parties resolved the prior dispute regarding a conditional use application by way of a
compromise, and that compromise was that Salt Lake County in good faith would consider the
Conditional Use Application under a specific statute.
Salt Lake County never in fact considered it agreed upon criteria and then the Trial Court
rewrote the parties agreement as if there had been no quid pro quo.
The District Court gave the benefit of the bargain to Salt Lake County and did not hold
Salt Lake County to the agreed upon quid pro quo.
Appellant submits that there can be no question regarding rewriting the parties contract
and Salt Lake County does not even address the same in their Red Brief.
Appellant submits that Salt Lake County apparently agrees that the Lower Courts
dismissal on this basis was error.
Now having failed to respond in their Reply Brief, Appellee should be precluded from
addressing the same for the first time in oral argument.
On page 19 of the Appellee's Red Brief Salt Lake County argues that since Appellant did
not file any written argument on Appellee's newly raised issue on appeal regarding an alleged
failure to prosecute that the appropriate remedy, according to Salt Lake County is that they
should win hands down with the appeal dismissed.
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Appellant submits that if this Court were to apply the same standard to Salt Lake County
that Salt Lake County suggests for the Appellant then this Court should grant the relief requested
on appeal and determine as a matter of law that Plaintiff has prevailed on appeal on five of its
eight claims.
Appellant submits that this Court should look carefully at the contents of the Appellee's
Red Brief and determine if Salt Lake County has in fact failed to respond to over half of the
Appellants Blue Brief on five of eight different arguments.
If so then this Court should not allow trial by ambush and oral argument by Salt Lake
County.
CONCLUSION
Appellant submits that it was error for the Trial Court to dismiss the Plaintiffs breach of
contract claims wherein the Lower Court subjectively concluded that the First, Second and Third
Causes of Action were merely a single cause of action for failure to issue a permit.
As noted above, the Complaint for Declaratory Relief repeatedly referenced the breach
of contract in the relevant paragraphs.
Appellant submits that motions to dismiss are to be treated as if they were a Motion for
Summary Judgment where the same should be liberally construed allowing the Plaintiff to
proceed on the merits. R.J. Daum Constr. Co. v. Child, 122 Utah 194, 247 P.2d 817 (1952).
Plaintiff had to wait until the entire matter had been adjudicated under Rule 54 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which it did before filing the timely Motion for Appeal.
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RELIEF SOUGHT
Appellant requests that this Court reverse and remand this matter to the Lower Court with
instructions to judicially determine the correct standard to be applied in the Conditional Use
Application with an Order to the Lower Tribunal to apply the correct standard in reference to the
same.
Dated this

of June, 2005.

JOHN WALSH
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing
REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT to the Defendant, by mailing the same to DON
HANSEN, DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY, 2001 SOUTH STATE STREET, #S3400, SALT
LAKE CITY, UTAH, 84190-1200.
Dated this /Yday of June, 2005.

JOHNWALSH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
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